As serious discussions on Kosovo in the UN Sec. Council are approaching, it might be time to think of scenarios. I can see three scenarios that might happen.

The first one would be that the UN Sec. Council votes to endorse the Ahtisaari plan. This would primarily mean Russia backing down from its insistence on an agreed solution (i.e. Serbia agreeing to any plan for Kosovo). Considering that Russia has made a considerable investment in preventing a vote, including the visit of UN Sec. Council members to Kosovo, any simple backing down of Russia seems unlikely at this point. Secondly, if Russia was isolated, pressure might mount, but it seems like not only some other UN Sec. Council members, but also some EU members are less than enthusiastic about the plan which would secure Kosovo's independence. Thus, this outcome seems increasingly unlikely.

In the second scenario, Russia would successfully block the resolution and/or push for a resolution to continue negotiations. Besides the fact that the odds for any negotiated solution between Kosovo and Serbia are infinitely small, such a resolution is unlikely to be endorsed by the USA and UK. Instead, this scenario would mean no resolution. In this case, a unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo would be recognized by some countries, the UN mission would loose all legitimacy, and the North of Kosovo would secede. The risk for violence in Mitrovica or against Serbs in enclaves elsewhere would be great, as would be a turn to the nasty in Serbia (esp. if there will be new elections). Exactly for this reason, EU and USA will try to avoid this outcome.

The third, and in my view most likely, scenario is that the UN Security Council will pass a compromise resolution which does not fully endorse Artisaari plan, but acknowledges it (or something along these lines), transfers the international administration from UN to EU and offers to take final decision (maybe on the basis of the Artisaari plan, just like the UN Sec. Council Res. 1244 takes account of the Rambouillet plans) within a closely defined time frame (i.e. one year or less). This would allow Russia to claim victory, while preventing a chaotic vacuum in Kosovo. The key challenge will be on how to secure support from the Kosovo Albanian elite to prevent a unilateral declaration of independence or violence. While not exactly the ideal case scenario, this solution might allow the EU mission to prepare Kosovo for independence and avoid a void, which would be worse in terms of precedent setting and potential violence than no resolution at all.

Here's a short interview for RFE I gave on the Kosovo status discusion in Serbian and in Albanian

Finally the "I" word has been mentioned officially for Kosovo. Today Ahtisaari unveiled his plan for Kosovo and after avoiding now, as expected, mentions that Kosovo should be given independence. The hesitancy over the past seven years to name future status of Kosovo this explicitly has been understandable, but also gave unrealistic hope to the Serbian elite that anything else was an option. At this point, unfortunately, it still looks like Serbian authorities will be busier preventing the decision in the Sec. Council and any implementation, rather than making the best of the offer and the extensive minority rights protections offered in the package.

Gloomy?
When discussing the Western Balkans with analysts and policy makers, one can notice distinct mood shifts over the years. In some cases is might be just because you are at a gathering of optimists or pessimists, in other cases it has little to do with the situation in the countries, as it might be the case of dissapointed internatioanl (false) expections or what is bad in one country does not necessarily bode ill for another.
Be this as it may, it was striking to note the worried atmosphere at a meeting last week in Paris of EU policy makers and analysts. After 2006 seemed like a year where transition from post-conflict to European integration would be more tangible, little was decided. Now 2007 might be overwhelmed by the legacy of 2006. Both the status decision for Kosovo and the shutting down of the OHR in Bosnia appears already to be too much in one go. So, local 'ownership', the buzzword of a few years back has fallen in popularity. It appears that the future EU mission in Kosovo will be similar to the OHR including the Bonn-powers (to dimiss officials and pass legislation) and since the current High Rep. Schwarz Schilling is leaving early and even he noted the continued need for the OHR, full souvereignty to Bosnia also seem to be not forthcoming any time soon. To a large degree, the talk of an independence referendum of the Serb Republic by Milorad Dodik is to blame. Ironically, one of the politicians the most critical of the international community and of the OHR in particular has thrown it another life-line.
Whether the OHR will remain effective and it's decision legitimate remains to be seen. It is an emperor without clothes and if it is called on its weakness, there might be difficulties ahead. A few years back, a good part of Bosnian citizens supported an increase in the power of the OHR, in 2006 the UND early warning report notes that supporters of reducing the OHR's competences are larger than those who would like to increase it among all three national communities. Similarly in Kosovo, there is a question whether such a type of mission will be legitimate and accepted, especially as the status solution is unlikely to satisfy anybody fully.
Finally, as there is a sense that EU enlargement might be slowed down and not because of the countries in the region, but because of the EU's current internal crisis, the key carrot might be loosing some of its pull.
Altogether, the meeting left me thinking that despite some key decisions being taken in 2007, stability remains at risk and we might have to wait for 2008 for more courageous steps towards EU Integration of the region.

Last Monday, I participated in a discussion on the status of Kosovo and its implications at LSE. What was striking beside the apparently large interest in the topic was the diaspora mobilization. As a result, it was more controversial and difficult to talk calmly about some issues, such as conditional independence, than in Belgrade (or Prishtina). I guess abroad there are more people who see their role as "professionally" defending what they think their nations' interest is.